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Abstract
We distinguish between identification and establishing causality. Identification
means forming a unique mapping from features of data to quantities that are of interest
to economists. Establishing causality is synonymous with finding sources of exogenous
variation. These two issues are often confused. However, exogenous variation is only
sometimes necessary and never sufficient to identify economically interesting param-
eters. Instead, even for causal questions identification must rest on an underlying
economic model. We illustrate these points by examining identification in two recent
papers: one causal study relying on an entirely verbal model and one non-causal study
relying on a formal mathematical model.
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1. Introduction
In terms of its pure statistical definition, identification is simple. An applied econometrician
defines an objective function over parameters and a data population, and her goal is to select
parameters that minimize this objective function, in which the population has been replaced
by a specific sample. A parameter is identified if there is a unique minimum for the objective
function at its true value in the population. Yet discussion of this pure statistical issue of
identification is not of particular interest to applied economists because the parameter at the
minimum of the objective function may or may not be of interest from an economic point
of view. For example, if we say a regression of price on quantity does not identify demand,
we are not arguing that the regression itself is not well-formed. Ordinary least squares
produces an unbiased estimate of the slope coefficient on price. However, we are stating
that this estimation has not identified an economic parameter, typically a utility parameter,
that we find interesting. The true problem of identification is then using an econometric
objective function to form a mapping from observed data to relevant economic parameters.
Unfortunately, identifying an economically interesting parameter is far more difficult than
the sheer statistical definition of identification might suggest.
The purpose of this paper is to delineate the relationship between estimating a causal
effect and the more general issues of identification. Since at least Alfred Marshall’s Principles
of Economics, economists have understood causality as a ceterus paribus comparison: the
causal effect of variable A on variable B is the change in B that results from altering A while
holding all other features of the world constant. See, for instance, the discussion in Heckman
and Pinto (2015). Causal effects are simply elasticities, but they are difficult to estimate
because econometricians rarely observe occasions where one variable is altered while others
are held constant, that is, where there is genuine exogenous variation in a variable.
This exogenous variation forms the focus of how many economists think about identifica-
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tion. However, the general issue of identification is broader in scope than the establishment of
exogenous variation. We want to make three points on this subject. First, identification re-
lates to parameters of an econometric model. In some applications, these parameters are the
elasticities that define causal effects, but, as we show below, they need not be. Relatedly, not
all interesting questions are causal in nature, so not all identification issues revolve around
establishing causality. For example, one might be able to run an experiment to establish
that a causal effect exists, but the experiment alone cannot establish what the effect means,
and often the economic forces that are behind the causal effect are at least as interesting
as the effect itself. Second, finding exogenous variation in a variable is never sufficient for
identification of an economically interesting parameter, and for some questions, exogenous
variation may not be necessary. In addition, neither the presence of random variation nor
the establishment of causality necessarily fulfills the goal of answering interesting questions.
Third, identification of an economically interesting parameter is always based on a verbal or
mathematical theory. Thus, identification can never be free of assumptions or even light on
assumptions.
None of these points are entirely new. In fact, the last can be traced back at least as far
as Koopmans (1949), who pointed out:
Where statistical data are used as one of the foundation stones on which the
equation system is erected, the modern methods of statistical inference are an
indispensable instrument. However, without economic “theory” as another foun-
dation stone, it is impossible to make such statistical inference apply directly to
the equations of economic behavior which are most relevant to analysis and to
policy discussion.
We will illustrate these points by looking at two different papers and examining how each
identifies an economic parameter. Along the way, we also relate each of these identification
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strategies back to the statistical definition of identification.
Because the problem of identification is really a problem of identifying interesting param-
eters, it matters which parameters are deemed to be interesting. In practice, parameters are
going to be interesting if they address important questions being asked in a body of research.
For example, there are many questions for which economists are ultimately concerned with
the effect of limited government interventions on economic variables: how an increase in the
minimum wage affects employment (Neumark and Wascher 1992; Card and Krueger 1994;
Dube et al. 2010; Sorkin 2015), how class size affects achievement (Angrist and Lavy 1999;
Krueger 1999; Krueger and Whitmore 2001; Chetty et al. 2011), or how training affects earn-
ings (Ashenfelter 1978; Ashenfelter and Card 1985; Heckman et al. 1997). In all these cases
the parameter of interest is a simple elasticity. The government has a lever at its disposal,
and we want to know what happens to some outcome when it pulls that lever. This sim-
ple ceteris paribus comparison surrounding a specific and limited government intervention
makes identification relatively straight-forward. In such a situation, it is common to see
researchers adopt an experimental approach. Yet even in this straightforward context, the
average treatment effect that comes from such an approach is limited in its applicability.
It represents only an estimate of the average causal effect of a variable under a particular,
historical intervention. Without additional assumptions, it is difficult to extrapolate any
such results to predictions about future interventions of a similar type. Nonetheless, if the
goal of a study is only to establish the average effect of a previous intervention, then we
can answer this question by estimating the relevant elasticity, as long as there is exogenous
variation along the same dimension as the lever in the specific intervention. In this case,
if the causal link to a government policy has been identified, the problem is solved. The
link between causality and identification in these popular quasi-experimental studies makes
it easy to confuse identification with the establishment of causality through exogenous vari-
ation. In fact, Angrist and Pischke (2008) present the issue of identification entirely as a
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search for an approximation to an ideal experiment.
However, not all questions of interest can be phrased in experimental terms. In particular,
in corporate finance, we are rarely confronted with the strong policy levers that have made
the estimation of treatment effects one of the central activities of many areas of applied
microeconomics. Yet we do have interesting questions to answer.
2. Identification with exogenous variation
For example, Bennedsen et al. (2007) studies Danish family firms, asking whether in-family
succession of CEOs hurts performance. Given that most firms in the world are family firms,
this question is clearly of interest. This question can also be phrased as a ceteris paribus
comparison: how would the performance of the company have been different if an outside hire
had been chosen as a CEO instead of a family member? In contrast to other comparisons,
where the concern is with the impact of a government policy, here the parameter of interest is
really related to an underlying agency problem. If an in-family CEO is appointed, he is drawn
from a limited pool of family members. Within this limited pool, candidates are unlikely to
be as proficient as if they were drawn from the broader market outside the family. So while
the inside hire creates a non-pecuniary benefit to the family, it could hurt the performance
of the firm. To understand the magnitude of this agency problem, we want to estimate the
loss in performance that is due to the choice of a family member over an outsider. The loss
in performance is a consequence caused by the choice of a family member over an outside
candidate, but the parameter that measures the performance loss is of interest not because
it represents an average, presumably causal, estimated effect: it is interesting because it
represents a deeper agency friction.
Identifying the parameter that represents this agency friction is difficult because demand
for a family CEO is endogenous to the performance of the company. Poor performance may
force the family to choose an outside CEO instead of a relative, and good performance may
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make a family insouciant about the specter of an incompetent family CEO. In this case, in
a simple regression of performance on the choice of CEO:
performance = α + β(In-family succession) + u
the coefficient on in-family succession, β, does not identify agency costs, because it is a
function of both agency costs and the unobserved economic variables affecting demand for
family CEOs. While the statistical parameter is well defined, the OLS objective function
does not have a unique minimum at the true value of agency costs, as the model of the
underlying economics of the question does not allow for a mapping of this regression slope,
β, to the agency parameter of interest.
In order to identify the agency friction, the model needs more structure. With data
from Danish firms, the authors can observe the demographics of controlling families. They
choose the gender of the first-born child as an instrument to determine the causal impact of
in-family succession. The argument the authors present is that families without male first-
born children will be less likely to choose a family CEO, yet families with and without male
first-born children should have ex-ante identical performance, as the biology of child gender
is genuinely random. Crucially, while biology buys randomness, the power of the instrument
in identifying the agency frictions comes from two additional assumptions added to the
model. For the agency parameter to be identified, the reader has to believe the following.
First, female CEOs will be no different from male CEOs, otherwise the instrument does not
satisfy the exclusion restriction. Second, Danish families have a preference for primogeniture,
otherwise the instrument will be weak (Staiger and Stock 1997). If both of these assumptions
hold, then the instrumental variables objective function formed from the gender of the eldest
child has a unique minimum at the agency cost friction, which is then identified.
These identifying assumptions are relatively mild, but they are still assumptions, and
family preference for primogeniture is less innocuous than it seems. To see the importance
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of this assumption, note that most completely random variables, for example, the inches of
rainfall in Kansas in a year, are useless as instruments for identifying the effects of agency
problems on firm performance because Danish family firms do not react them. The gender
of a first-born child makes a good instrument not only because it is random but because
Danish firms react to the instrument. Thus, in order to use the exogenous variation from
the gender of the first-born, we must also assume controlling families are somewhat sexist.
In the absence of sexism, the instrument has no bearing on the succession decision, and the
parameter is again unidentified. If we are willing to assume that sexism exists, then the
exclusion restriction is that sexism affects firm performance only through the choice of a
family CEO, and this assumption is non-trivial. For instance, imagine that sexism causes
controlling families to raise first-born boys and girls differently. Boys are groomed to lead the
family firm, while girls are encouraged to pursue other professions. In this case, the gender
of the (potential) family CEO would affect (potential) firm performance, and the exclusion
restriction would not hold. The data provide no evidence for or against the possibility of
grooming, so identification requires that one assume away this possibility. This example thus
illustrates that it is not exogenous variation alone that allows the agency parameter to be
identified, it is the assumptions made in the verbal theory of behavior this paper advances.
3. Identification without exogenous variation
For some questions, exogenous variation is not even necessary to identify an economically
interesting parameter. In fact, causal inference in general may not be the point. To illus-
trate this point, we turn outside corporate finance and examine Davis et al. (2014), which
asks the extent to which agglomeration externalities impact aggregate consumption growth.
Agglomeration externalities are the productivity gains that occur when workers and firms
locate in the same area. In this case, the identification of the impact of agglomeration on
consumption growth is more difficult, in large part because the question cannot be phrased
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as a ceteris paribus comparison. For example, one would want to compare consumption
growth in Chicago as it currently is with consumption growth in a counter-factual “city” in
which Chicago’s population is spread out over Illinois (but no other changes are made). Of
course, such a situation is difficult to envision, and impossible to observe.
Nonetheless, the process used to establish identification carries many similarities with the
process used to establish identification in Bennedsen et al. (2007). Davis et al. (2014) starts
with an explicit set of assumptions that underlie a dynamic general-equilibrium model of
agglomeration in cities. In the model, firms do not take into account the positive productivity
spillovers that they generate when they hire extra workers within a city. This externality
then affects consumption growth as long as land prices are rising. In this case, an increase
in the forecast of land prices leads firms to economize on space now. This reaction in turn
leads to an increase in productivity via the externality because more workers and firms are
clustered onto a smaller space. The set of assumptions that leads to this behavior in the
model in turn implies that the correlation between a forecast of land prices and the growth of
total factor productivity is a function of the agglomeration externality and some other easily-
estimated parameters. This result means that the OLS objective function in a regression of
total factor productivity on forecasted land prices has a unique minimum at the true value
of the agglomeration externality parameter, without the need for any exogenous source of
variation.
This identification is not assumed. Just as in Bennedsen et al. (2007), it is the result of
a careful argument extended from a set of assumptions. However, there are two important
differences between identification in the structural study and identification in the reduced
form study. First, the arguments in Davis et al. (2014) are phrased using mathematics, and
the arguments in Bennedsen et al. (2007) are verbal. Second, all of the assumptions needed
for identification are contained in Davis et al. (2014). In contrast, some of the identifying
assumptions in Bennedsen et al. (2007) are not contained in the paper, even though the paper
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is quite explicit in stating that the gender of the first-born can only affect CEO succession
via the choice of a family CEO, and even though the paper is as careful as it can be to
convince the reader that all possibilities for violation of the exclusion restriction have been
exhausted. Despite the cleanness of the natural experiment and the high level of care taken
in its execution, because the identifying assumptions are verbal, there is always room to
consider new alternatives, such as the priming we describe above, that could violate the
exclusion restriction.
4. Conclusion
Both our examples illustrate the importance of a model for identification by pointing out
that the model allows for the identification of an interesting quantity with a statistical pa-
rameter by advancing an internally consistent set of assumptions. A mathematical model is
not essentially better or worse for this purpose than a verbal one. But careful advancement
of a set of assumptions is difficult to accomplish verbally. Lawyers and researchers in the hu-
manities practice for years to make their verbal arguments internally consistent. Economists
are rarely so well prepared when they venture into a verbal model, but we have a great deal
of experience with making mathematical arguments. So while mathematical models are not
essentially better, they are often easier for economists to apply. Still, the theory is what
allows us to identify structural parameters from statistical quantities.
Both examples also illustrate that the question to be addressed comes before the model or
the natural experiment. The model, with all of its assumptions, or the natural experiment,
with its accompanying assumptions, is only a tool. It would be difficult to address the
in-family CEO succession question with the estimation of a dynamic model, which would
need to incorporate both product market conditions and family dynamics. In addition, as
pointed out above, it would be impossible to assess the affects of agglomeration externalities
with a natural experiment. More generally, there is no one approach that will be useful for
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answering all questions. But for whatever kind of question one asks, the key to identifying
relevant parameters is to proceed guided by (either verbal or mathematical) theory and
conscious of the necessary assumptions.
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